Given that adults were traditionally expected to stay at home until they got married (Parsons, 1949), it was assumed that its old-school iteration had a better grasp on what marriage is. Marriage has been seen as a key institutional limit on the boundary of where we move from childhood into more adult social roles and also depend on each other economically (Parsons, 1949). This is no longer the case in present-day societies. The median age of marriage has been rising steadily across North America, Europe, and East Asia, one whereby the age at first marriage have often surpassed 30 years (OECD, 2020; Raymo et al., 2015). According to sociological study, this delay should not be described as a decline of close relationships, but rather an adaptive response to macro-structural changes in modern society.
The capstone model and the individualization thesis
In the early to mid-twentieth century, conjugal patterns identified the notion of marriage as the "cornerstone" of the structure, with a whole few generations of young people using it as the foundation for home, money, and children (World Bank, 2007). In contrast, the concept of marriage as a "capstone" is predominant in the contemporary world (Cherlin, 2004, 2020). In this paradigm, marriage is a marker of achievement and status, demonstrating that an individual has:
1. Gained post-graduate and tertiary education,
2. Is employed and financially independent, and
3. Mentally mature and developed good interpersonal skills. This transition is in line with the late-modern individualization thesis (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1992). Biographies have changed from historically prescripted pathways to introspective, customized "what-a-do-it-yourself projects. Simultaneously, Jeffrey Arnett (2000) conceptualization of emerging adulthood, on the other hand, shows how macro-structural extension of schooling and credential inflation creates an extended developmental period defined by identity exploration and relationship commitment delay.
Labor market precarity and assortative mating
Economic resources are still an influential factor influencing marriage timing. The single-earner family wage has collapsed (Kalleberg, 2011; Smock & Schwartz, 2020). This, combined with decreasing real wage growth in low panel labor markets, increasing living costs, and housing unaffordability, has raised the economic expectations of starting independent households (Kalleberg, 2011; Smock & Schwartz, 2020).
Educational and economic homogeny has become more pronounced (Schwartz, 2013). With young adults increasingly sorting together in partnerships, based on complementary human capital, marrying is delayed as prospective spouses build the educational capital and income levels to fittest an assortative marriage market characterized by a high degree of probable permanence (Oppenheimer, 2003).
Reshaping gender roles and the costs of opportunity
With the shift of the female labor force at large in the market, the male instrumental, and female expressive roles described by Parsonian functionalism (i.e., male breadwinner vs female caregiver) were structurally destroyed (Parsons, 1949; Goldscheider et al., 2015). This reduces women's dependency to marry early, however it also raises the cost of starting a family early (Becker, 1981; England, 2010). The actual ability of institutions (e.g. parental leave, subsidised childrearing) and the equitable division of labor in the home often fall behind female labour participation - the "second shift" structural lag (Hochschild, 1989 ), which lead many women to miss out on marriage to avoid taking a career hit and enduring augmenting domestic burden (Goldscheider et al., 2015).
Deinstitutionalization and alternative union trajectories
Marriage is no longer the only adult son-in-law type of thing to do, no longer signals we should live, love, make love, and eventually procreate together . Cherlin (2004) defined the deinstitutionalization of marriage as the decay of the social norms surrounding marital conduct and life-cycle timing. It has been recognized where the fragmentation and dissolution of traditional assumptions of institutions and values, as well as the lack of social and cultural condemnation of chance sex without consummated marriage, have extended the opportunities and expectations for desire, romantic intimacy and employment activity to include non-marriage alternatives (Smock & Schwartz, 2020). The stigma against premarital cohabitation and having a child outside marriage has been withering - participants who otherwise would not be able to fulfill their interpersonal needs for companionship or combine his or her economic resources to their own cost of legal tying.
Conclusion
The delaying of marriage is a logical response to the pressures of late-modern advanced economies, lengthened educational timelines, ongoing economic insecurity, and changing egalitarian gender expectations. Postponing marriage does not mean they feel they have left the institution behind; instead, it signals that the benchmark has been raised - that only those who can afford to are formally allowed to enter into union.
Written by: PhuHM
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